Introduction
Individual economic well being during old age and periods of unemployment and sickness is positively related to private wealth, especially in an economy where government has little ability to provide adequate social insurance. China is in the process of moving from state provision of all social welfare to a new system that relies heavily upon individual responsibility. In this new economic environment, accumulation and distribution of personal wealth will play an important role.
In the pre-reform era it was neither possible nor necessary to accumulate significant levels of personal wealth in urban China. Income was extremely low, making wealth accumulation difficult. Private property was seen as the root of capitalism and therefore forbidden. Neither a housing nor any other kind of capital market existed. Wealth accumulation was largely unnecessary because every urban resident was guaranteed a life-time job, a full pension, life-time free medical services, and free education for their children.
The acceleration of economic reform over the last decade has brought great change to the Chinese urban economy. A dramatic increase in income, and the establishment of housing and other kinds of financial markets, has made it possible for individuals to accumulate significant quantities of wealth quite quickly. In addition, the labor market and social security reform has narrowed the protection provided by the state welfare system making it necessary for individuals to accumulate wealth to protect themselves from adverse economic shocks and provide income for their old age. The result has been rapid wealth accumulation over a short period. For example, between 1995 and 2002 urban per capita real household net total wealth increased more than four fold.
Nevertheless, there is a concern that those accumulating wealth are economic or political elites while those unable to accumulate wealth are the most vulnerable workers who are losing social protection. (Ferreira, 1999; Alexeev, 1999) , empirical studies of wealth accumulation and distribution during transition are rare. The few available studies on wealth accumulation and distribution in China mainly focus on the rural sector (Mckinley, 1993 and 1996) or use data for the period before the acceleration of urban economic reform.
For example, Wang (1995) examines wealth distribution using data from the 1986 household survey. The only other study of household wealth in urban China using UHIDS95 data is currently in working-paper stage (Gustafesson, Li, and Wei, 2000) .
Income and savings are major contributors to wealth accumulation and there is an extensive literature in both these fields, although the research is not usually linked directly to wealth accumulation and distribution. Many studies have examined income distribution in China (Knight and Song, 1991; Gustafsson and Li, 1997 , 1998 ; Knight and Li, 1999 ; Kahn, Griffin, and Riskin, 1999; Yang, 2000; Khan and Riskin, 2000; Riskin, Zhao, and Meng, 2004) . One of the main findings is that income inequality increased during the decade before 1995 with regional variation being the major contributor. Meng (2004) shows that growth of income inequality has accelerated since then and unemployment associated with labour market reform has replaced regional dispersion as the major contributor. 3 Other studies have investigated household saving (consumption) behavior in China Ravillion, 1996, 1998; Wang, 1995 Giles, 2006) . A common finding is that over the reform period there has been a significant increase in the household saving rate. This paper links these two literature strands together and directly relates changes in income distribution and household savings to changes in wealth accumulation and distribution.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides institutional background on wealth accumulation in urban China. Section 3 presents basic statistics and graphics of the change in income and wealth distribution over the period. Section 4 discusses the determinants of wealth while concluding remarks are given in Section 5
Background
In most developed countries personal wealth is acquired from three main sources: lifetime saving, inheritance, and asset appreciation (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000) . Browning and Lusardi (1996) cited Keynes' (1936) list of the nine motives for saving and suggested that the list seemed complete even from a 1990s' point of view. These motives are: the precautionary motive, the life-cycle motive, the intertemporal substitution motive, the improvement motive, the independence motive, the enterprise motive, the bequest motive, the avarice motive, and the downpayment motive.
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In urban China's pre-reform era (before 1978), three important factors prevented individual households from accumulating substantial personal wealth. First, income levels were low and barely enough for day-to-day living, let alone saving (Kraay, 2000) .
2 Thus, the intertemporal, improvement, and avarice motives were suppressed. Second, a social welfare system provided every urban individual with cradle-to-grave welfare, ensuring
1 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a detailed explanation of each of these motives. 2 As indicated in Kraay (2000) , although saving rates were high before 1978, household savings only accounted for a small proportion of total saving. He shows that in 1979 the urban household saving rate was below 5 per cent (see Figure 4 in Kraay (2000) ).
life-time employment, full support for family medical expenses, fully funded old age pension, public accommodation at very low rental, and free children's schooling. Therefore, the need to save for precautionary, lifecycle, or bequest motives was absent. Third, the planned economy and lack of financial, housing and other important durable goods markets suppressed household downpayment and enterprize motives.
As economic reform proceeds, however, the importance of these three factors has gradually changed. Over the last twenty or so years, urban incomes have continued to More importantly, since the late 1980s, economic reform gradually swept away almost all aspects of the old social security system at the same time as state owned enterprizes began to lay off large numbers of workers. Old age, medical, and unemployment support has moved toward a system where individual responsibility is replacing state provision.
Finally, although the development of capital markets has been slow, there has been large change in the provision of housing. Housing reform began with an increase in official rents before proceeding to allow government housing occupants to buy their own housing at a highly subsidized price, and then, finally moving on to a further opening up of the housing market. By 2002, most urban households had an expectation that they would purchase their own housing and the majority of urban households had already done so. All these factors have significantly increased households' precautionary, lifecycle, downpayments, and enterprize motives for accumulating wealth. In addition to rapid growth in wealth accumulation, the process of wealth accumulation and distribution in urban China has a number of special features. The most relevant feature for this paper is the role of individual political status in the acquisition of wealth.
Even though political status has always benefited high level government and party officials, economic reform has commercialized this status through the distribution of labor and non-labor income (Morduch and Sicular, 2000) and through the distribution of housing. For example, in the old system the size and quality of housing was determined by individual political power and occupational status. High level government officials and party members were often given better and larger housing to rent. The housing reform introduced in the early 1990s allowed those who were renting government housing to buy their occupied housing at a heavily subsidized price. The subsidy was also positively related to the seniority and political positions of household members. Thus, the acquisition of housing, which accounted for more than half of the average household wealth in 1999 and 2002, was affected by political status on two counts, the initial allocation of better housing and larger purchase price discounts.
Another special feature in personal wealth accumulation and distribution in urban China is the way in which inheritance takes place. The lack of wealth among the older generation means that the typical process of wealth inheritance observed in the west has been relatively unimportant in China. Children of important government or party 6 officials, however, can easily profit from their parents' business networks and political connections. In addition, in the pre-reform era, children of individuals with high political power were normally able to acquire better housing which could subsequently be purchased at highly subsidized prices.
One of the main purposes of accumulating wealth is to protect individuals from the adverse effects of future uncertainties and old age poverty. Given the unique features of wealth accumulation in urban China there is a concern that those accumulating wealth are the economic or political elites while those unable to accumulate wealth are the most vulnerable workers who, at the same time, are losing social protection.
Wealth accumulation and distribution
The data used for the empirical work are taken from three Urban Household Income 3 Note, however, that in the 1995 survey there were 33 cities included in the 6 provinces. In 1999, only 13 of these 33 cities were included, while in 2002, 30 of these 33 cities were included. It is, therefore, important to bear in mind that the inconsistency of the number of cities included in the sample of the 6 provinces may introduce some problems in the comparability of the sample over time. 4 There is a concern about whether the proportion of the sample individuals who are party members is too high in the CHIPs' samples. This is, however, hard to verify as there are no official statistics available
The surveys ask for detailed information on household financial, housing, productive and other assets, including household durables in value terms. In addition, the survey collects detailed debt information, including mortgage, borrowing for productive purposes, buying household durables, medical related debt, and other debt due to family difficulties.
Regarding financial assets, seven detailed categories are included: term deposits, deposits in savings accounts, stocks, government bonds, personal lending, family productive use of personal financial wealth, and other investments. Based on these data a household net wealth measure is derived. Table 1 figure) , the proportion of urban 18 and above population being party members should be 19.5 per cent. According to this figure, the data used in this study over sampled party members (the estimate in our data is 25.5, see Appendix A).
The only other data available to the author on urban party member rate is the 2000/2001 China Urban Labor Survey (CULS) on five large cities. The party member rates using this data (for comparable population, namely 18 and above) are presented in the second panel of Appendix A. The statistics show that the ratio of party members in the 1999 CHIPs sample is around 4 percentage points higher than that in the 2000 CULS sample, that is 25 per cent compared to 21 per cent. This difference may to some extent be due to difference in region and timing of the surveys. 5 Note that the per capita household income presented in this paper does not include imputed rent value from owner-occupied housing.
inheritance was negligible during this period, a faster increase in wealth than income suggests that either saving propensity increased significantly or a large proportion of wealth accumulation was from other non-saving sources.
6 This issue will be examined later in this Section.
The differences between housing and net total wealth growth rates are mainly the result of the faster pace of housing reform during the 1995 to 1999 period. Table 2 Lorenz curves for these assets are presented in Figure 2 , which indicates that at the extreme ends of the distribution, there are signs of Lorenz-crossings in these distributions. In most cases the Lorenz-crossings occur between 1995 and 1999. Although wealth inequality for various assets, except housing, appear to be most unequal in 1999, Lorenzcrossings imply that the change in inequality measures of the assets presented here and in Table 1 Furthermore, relative to income growth average wealth growth rates have been much faster (see Table 1 Figure 4 shows the result. It indicates that the projected wealth (pure saving wealth) is lower than actual wealth for households in all income percentiles. However, the amount of non-saving wealth is much higher for households with above average income levels than their poor counterparts. For example, in 1999 households with below 20 percentile income levels, on average, derived 18 per cent of wealth from non-saving sources, while for those with income levels above 80 percentiles 9 Saving is calculated by subtracting household total expenditure from household total income. 10 The projection is calculated as follows: c
wealth from saving alone, W is the actual wealth level, s is the saving rate,
• y is the income growth rate, and Y is the actual income level.
this ratio is 42 per cent. In 2002 the rich also received much more wealth from non-saving sources than the poor. These results suggest the rich might have been given more wealth than the poor in the form of direct wealth transfers, such as housing, or in the form of income, such as gifts.
Of course, if existing wealth appreciated at a very high rate it could be another explanation for the existence of sizable non-saving wealth. This, however, is unlikely to explain the major part of the difference between actual and predicted wealth levels. 11 Taking into account the proportion of net housing wealth to net total wealth for each income percentile and each survey year, the effect of housing price (both official and survey data) appreciation on net total wealth is also projected. This is shown in Figure 4 as the two dotted lines and both are still much lower than the actual net total wealth levels.
In addition to the inequality of wealth distribution among high and low income households, households whose heads are party members accumulated more wealth than those whose heads are not party members. Table 4 shows that in 1995 households headed by 11 The data on residential housing market selling prices for each of the six provinces in each of the survey years are listed in Appendix B. These data are obtained from Note that the 1995 survey did not ask for the self-evaluated market value of owner occupied housing but only the total housing wealth information. The information on living area, however, is on owner occupied housing, and hence, it is not possible to derive a comparable variable to those derived from the 1999 and 2002 data. The above summary statistics indicate that household wealth has grown rapidly during the period of study, and in particular, between 1995 and 1999. This occurred not only to high income but also to low income households. However, even though wealth increased for both rich and poor, the rich and politically elite gained the most of non-saving wealth.
Determinants of wealth 4.1 Results from the wealth equation
To further investigate the determinants of wealth, the following reduced-form wealth equation is estimated:
where X i is a vector of explanatory variables, including age of household head, 12 Ages of the household head and spouse are highly correlated. Hence, only the age of the household head is included in the regression. 13 The proportion of households with zero or negative total assets, net total assets, and financial assets is quite small, especially in the later years. The main source of the negative and zero wealth is net housing wealth, though over time the proportion reduces dramatically (See Table 1 ).
tions of different wealth measures are used as the dependent variables. Thus, equation
(1) may be written as:
The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is defined as: Equation (2) is estimated using the 1995, 1999, and 2002 UHIDS data. The selected marginal effects and bootstrapped standard errors for net total wealth, financial wealth and net housing wealth are reported in Table 5 . The top panel of Table 5 presents the results from net total wealth equation. The first important finding is a significant increase in the effects of income related variables on wealth over the three survey years. For example, evaluated at median wealth, the marginal effect of one more year of household head schooling increases household net total wealth by 296, 2498, and 3831 yuan and the marginal effect for one year of spouse schooling is 156, 1375, and 3214 yuan for the three survey years, respectively. These effects added together (one more year of education for household head and spouse) increase 14 This study uses 0.00005 for θ as it produces a closer approximation to a normal distribution in the data (see Appendix C for a plot of residuals). 15 The marginal effects are evaluated at the median level of wealth. Full results of estimated coefficients and marginal effects are available upon request from the author. Summary statistics of all variables used in these estimations are reported in Appendix A. Note also, as age in the 1995 and 1999 data has a non-linear relationship with wealth, a squared term is included. The Marginal Effect for age, therefore, is derived as ∂w/∂x = (β age + 2β Sage * Age) * ((θw) Another finding is that the effect of age on wealth in urban China differs from the lifecycle model, which predicts that individuals accumulate wealth until retirement and after that they begin to consume wealth. Thus, an inverse U-shaped relationship between wealth and age should be observed with the peak level of wealth around the retirement age. The estimations indicate that for 1995 and 1999, the net total wealth levels do exhibit an inverse U-shape relationship with the age of household head but they peak at age 52 in the 1995 survey and 76 in the 1999 survey. In 2002, the age wealth relationship is linear, continuously increasing with age (See Figure 5) . 16 This unusual shape may be due to the housing reform. The privatization of housing has made everyone wealthier, and the old, on average, have gained more, since they previously occupied larger and better located housing than the young. This conjecture will be confirmed later in Table   6 .
The relationship between gender and wealth is also interesting. 
Further understanding of the effect of party status
The above analysis indicates that the estimated effect of party member status on wealth accumulation is very important. How should these substantial party member premia be 17 Two common interpretations of the party member premium are: (1) Individuals with higher ability are more likely to join the party, and also to achieve better economic outcomes such as a higher income. As a result, they may accumulate more wealth. (2) Because of party members' political status they can acquire more economic resources and therefore can accumulate more wealth. 18 The first interpretation implies that party membership is a proxy for individual unobserved ability and the effect of party membership on wealth, therefore, is related to the return to unobserved human capital. The second interpretation suggests that the return to party membership is a pure political rent. In reality, both factors are probably at work and it is difficult to disentangle them. Given this difficulty it is best to interpret the estimated party membership premia as a combination of a reward to party members' unobserved abilities and to their political power.
Nevertheless, it may still be useful to explore further the ways through which party members accumulate extra wealth relative to non-party members. This subsection, in particular, examines how party members acquire extra housing wealth. This is important because housing wealth accounted for more than half average total wealth in both 1999 and 2002 and is primarily responsible for fast wealth growth.
The following two questions are explored: 1. Did party members possess larger and better housing before housing reforms began? 2. During housing reform did party members receive higher price subsidies?
The UHIDS surveys have information on household housing conditions, including size of the house, type of bathroom, kitchen, heating and cooking facilities, and location.
The survey also asks individuals the price at which they purchased the house and if they were to buy the house from the market place now what the current price would be. This information enable me to explore the two questions posed above.
To address the first question, the housing size and quality are regressed against a vector of household characteristics and household head and spouse' personal characteristics, including party membership status for the years 1988 and 1995 when the housing reform the observed positive association between party membership and wealth accumulation is not an artefact of more party members being employed in the state sector where the housing subsidy is more important. It is shown later that within the state sector, before housing privatization, party members were allocated larger and better housing and that during the privatization process party members also enjoyed higher subsidies.
had not yet or had only just begun. 19 Note that the variable indicating housing quality is an index generated from whether a house has both bathroom and toilet, central gas cooking facility, central heating, and own kitchen. These equations are estimated for the sample of households renting from the government (state owned work units) at the time of the survey. The estimated results are reported in the first four columns of Table 6 . It is observed that controlling for household and individual characteristics, party members possess larger houses. In 1988 the household head and spouse being a party member is associated with 6.2 per cent and 8.6 per cent more housing, respectively. In 1995, the ratios are 7.1 and 5.7 per cent, respectively. With regard to housing quality, it is observed that party membership of both household heads and spouses has a positive effect, though only the effect of the spouses' party membership is statistically significant.
Next the question of whether party members were given a higher price subsidy when they purchased the house during the housing reform is examined. To investigate this issue, the 1999 and 2002 data are used when the housing market was well developed.
In the surveys, respondents were asked to report the total amount paid to buy their current housing, and what they estimated the price would have been had they bought the house from the market place. The difference between the two should be a measure of the purchase price subsidy, after controlling for the timing difference between the point of purchase and the point of market price evaluation. Note that as the market price is estimated by respondents, the data are quite noisy and some respondents did not report a market value. To minimize measurement error in evaluated market price and to fill in missing values, a market value equation is first estimated using housing size, whether there is a central heating, central gas cooking, both bathroom and toilet, own kitchen, the location, the type of housing, and region as explanatory variables. After excluding a few outliers, the adjusted R 2 for the 1999 data is 0.43 and for 2002 it is 0.32 (see Appendix D for full results).
Using the estimated coefficients the market value of the housing is then predicted for each household. The purchase price subsidy is obtained by taking the difference between the predicted market value and the purchase value of the house. The results from the log purchase price subsidy equation for a sample of households who bought the house during the housing reform period are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 . In addition to the same explanatory variables used in the housing size and quality equations in Table 6 , variables indicating years since the household bought the house and its squared term are also included to control for price appreciation since the household bought the house. In Second, a large proportion of the increase in wealth accumulation may come from non-saving channels.
Third, although households at each income percentile have experienced increases in wealth and increases in non-saving wealth, the increase is larger for the high income group than for the low income group.
Fourth, wealth accumulation in China differs from the lifecycle model prediction.
Household wealth is almost linearly associated with household heads' age in recent years.
This unusual shape of the age-wealth profile is, perhaps, related to housing reform as the aged normally had larger housing and were able to benefit more from the housing reform. Note that, due to the inability to find good instruments, the estimated party membership effect is a combination of the reward to party members' unobservable ability and to their political power.
Finally, one reason why party members have more wealth than their non-party mem-
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ber counterparts is the larger and better housing they possessed prior to housing reform and the higher purchasing price subsidy they received during the housing reform. Of course, rewarding party members with better and larger housing and higher housing price subsidy can also be an ability related.
It is important to bear in mind that this paper only studies the private accumulation of wealth and wealth distribution among households. The issue of transfer of wealth (especially housing wealth) from the state to households and the tax implications of such transfers, although important in the context of China, are not investigated in this paper. 
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